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OLD-FASHIONED POSTMODERNISM AND THE LEGAL
THEORIES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.'
Catharine Pierce Wellst
INTRODUCTION
Whether Holmes was the greatest American jurist is a
question for debate. What needs no debate is the fact that
Holmes is the most published, the most discussed, the most
praised and the most criticized judge in American history. In
view of this fact, one might well doubt the need for yet another
paper on Holmes. The sheer number of studies, discussions,
collections and biographies raises question as to whether we
have not already said enough. Is there any point-besides the
obvious pleasure of a good symposium-to more discussion of
Holmes and his effect on American law? For a number of rea-
sons, I think that the answer to this question is a surprising
"yes." No one would dispute that Holmes is an important
source of our understanding about the American legal tradi-
tion. It is not just that his writings are widely read; it is also
that lawyers and scholars have treated him as a particularly
important symbol of American law, who-depending on your
viewpoint-should be praised for his virtues or condemned for
his shortcomings. For example, some scholars think that
Holmes deserves high praise for rescuing American law from
the rigidity of formalism.' Others disagree: they suggest that
@1997 Catharine Pierce Wells. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Boston College Law School BA, 1968, Wellesley College;
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' See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 270 (Peter Smith
1970) (1958).
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Holmes was insufficiently principled;2 that he was self serving,
insensitive and cynical;' and that, in view of these shortcom-
ings, he is an unworthy representative of American law.4
These criticisms are part of the reason why Holmes re-
mains-sixty years after his death-an important focus of legal
discussion. By all accounts, Holmes was a successful lawyer,
scholar and judge. Yet he is the subject of particularly vigorous
criticism-not from those who would tear down the institutions
of American law-but from those who would exalt them. On
the one hand, there is the reality of Holmes's successful and
distinguished career. On the other, there is his "bad man"
image' and the recurring doubts about his suitability to serve
as a salutary symbol of American law. This contrast is an
important part of his legacy-it suggests that there is, within
the American legal culture, a kind of collective ambivalence
about law and about the value of lives that are devoted to its
practice.
Despite all the pages that have been written about
Holmes, there is much about his views and his character that
remains elusive. It is easy enough to show that he was sympa-
2 As a pragmatist, Holmes is often criticized for the lack of principles that a
pragmatist philosophy entails. A good-if somewhat extreme--example of this kind
of criticism is found in Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J.
569, 573 (1945).
' E.g., Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L.
REV. 254 (1963); Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer:
Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833 (1986).
4 For example, Mark DeWolfe Howe writes: "[The concern is) not only that
Holmes' philosophy of law was inconsistent with the highest traditions and aspira-
tions of Western thought, but that his scale of moral and political values was
badly suited to measure the needs of a progressive and civilized society." Mark
DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531
(1951).
' In The Path of the Law, Holmes writes:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his rea-
sons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
171 (1920) [hereinafter Holmes, Path]. While his point is to clarify the distinction
between law and morals, many writers have taken this distinction to mean that
the law and those who practice it are not subject to any moral constraints. The
distinction between law and morals provides clarity but it is not a popular rally-
ing cry for those who desire that law should be both uplifting and inspiring.
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thetic to this or that intellectual tradition. Some have argued,
for example, that Holmes was a utilitarian.' But, if so, why
would he describe human beings as "ganglia" and "grains of
sand?"7 Why would he speak so disparagingly of human exis-
tence? As a utilitarian, after all, he would think that human
preferences should reign supreme. Or, as another example, if
Holmes were truly a cynical realist, what would account for all
the inspirational speeches about duty? What would explain his
references to "the infinite" and to the "universal" law?' The
problem is that Holmes seems to slip easily into many intel-
lectual categories but, in fact, fits none of them well Al-
though Holmes was well read, his opinions were uniquely his
own. When we go below the surface, we do not find an incon-
sistent dilettante; we find instead a confident and coherent
thinker with a serious grasp of the human condition.
There are many factors that influenced Holmes in formu-
lating his own unique view of the world. Certainly one of the
major influences on Holmes was the extreme hardship he expe-
rienced during the Civil War. During his three years in the
United States Army, he participated in some of the heaviest
fighting in the war. He was wounded three times-each time
emerging from the ordeal to witness a continuing bloodbath
where many of his friends suffered and died."0 These experi-
ences transformed his youthful idealism into a grim recogni-
tion of the undeniable claims of duty." But, while his war
r See, e-g., ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALSA AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982) and ILL. POHILMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILI-
TARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984).
7 See infra text accompanying note 68.
* Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 202.
My first article on Holmes, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual
Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 N. U. L, REV. 541
(1988), went further in this direction than I would now like. It is not so much a
question of whether Holmes is a pragmatist as it is a more generalized question
of context. Does a pragmatic vocabulary and world view serve us well in our at-
tempt to understand Holmes and to reconcile whatever contradictions are apparent
in his views?
10 Saul Toaster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 437
(1965).
" Holmes's most recent biographer, G. Edward White, argues that Holmes's
civil war experience had weakened his concept of duty-changing it from concept
of duty had thus progressed from an idea of fidelity to a cause to that of loyalty
to a regiment and finally to that of loyalty to oneself. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMiS: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 70 (1993). To support this,
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experiences may have shaped his life, they did not fall on a
blank slate. Holmes was the well educated son of a well re-
spected New England family;12 he grew up in an environment
where people were intensely interested in spiritual and philo-
sophical questions. When he returned from the war, he took an
active part in this environment, and it was this participation
that enabled him to structure the traumatized remains of his
Civil War experience into a serviceable and productive world
view. Understanding this world view will help us not only
understand Holmes, but also the legal tradition in which he
played such a central role.
There are at least two distinct ways of understanding the
content of one's own legal tradition. One can view it as the
development of certain intellectual themes or, in the alterna-
tive, view it as it is particularized in the thoughts and feelings
of individual participants. This paper is an attempt at both
kinds of understanding. While the focus is Holmes, I will pro-
ceed by analyzing a number of themes that define pragmatic
jurisprudence. In the first section, I describe classical pragma-
tism as it was formulated by Charles Peirce."3 In the second, I
discuss the pragmatic aspects of Holmes's jurisprudence. In the
third section, I note the similarities between Holmes's prag-
matic views and those that make up the more recent develop-
ment of postmodern jurisprudence. Finally, in the conclusion, I
he quotes a letter home in which Holmes wrote:
I honestly think the duty of fighting has ceased for me-ceased because I
have laboriously and with much suffering of mind and body earned the
right ... to decide for myself how I can best do my duty. ... The
ostensible and sufficient reason [for leaving the service] is my honest
belief that I cannot now endure the labors & hardships of the line.
Id. (footnote omitted). I think that White's reading of this letter is somewhat un-
charitable. Holmes is not, after all, talking about deserting the army or even
about trying to pull easy duty. He is talking about resigning at the end of his
enlistment because, after three long years and three nearly mortal wounds, he has
reached the limit of his abilities to persevere in the face of constant combat.
12 See generally MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER VENDELL HOLMES:
THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-1870 (1957).
13 Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
He was an American philosopher, physicist, mathematician and the founder of
pragmatism. Peirce wrote philosophical works predominately on logic from 1866
onwards. MURRAY G. MURPHEY, 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 70 (Paul Ed-
wards ed., 1967).
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suggest that Holmes, despite his "bad man" image, is a salu-
tary symbol for American law, and that the real virtues of his
position have not been fully appreciated.
I. CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM
American pragmatism originated in The Metaphysical
Club-a philosophical discussion group that met in the early
1870s. Its membership included Charles Peirce, William
James, Chauncey Wright, and Nicholas St. John Green, as well
as Holmes. 4 The name "pragmatism" was first put forward by
Charles Peirce"5 to describe a method of philosophy based up-
on a simple maxim:"6 "[clonsider what effects, that might con-
ceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our
conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the
whole of our conception of the object." 7 Simple though the
maxim may be, its consequences for philosophy are very pro-
found. Pragmatism, with its rejection of formalism, represented
a new way of looking at the world and an alternative way to
understand the increasingly rapid development of science.
During Holmes's lifetime, it became a powerful influence not
only in philosophy but in many other fields as well.
Although Holmes was a friend of William James"8 and a
participant in the Metaphysical Club, 9 he did not consider
" Max Fisch, Was There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge?, in STUDIES IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SAUNDERS PEIRCE 3 (Edward C. Moore & Richard S.
Robin eds., 1964).
"1 2 ELIZABETH FLOWER AND MURRAY G. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY 568 (Putnam 1977).
" In this essay, I treat the maxim as a premise of pragmatism. In fact, the
pragmatists offered arguments in its favor. I will not go into these here except to
say that they are of the type generally offered for empirical and reductionist phi-
losophies.17 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE 5.402 (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds., 1934).
" On the other hand, Holmes had little admiration for Peirce. He wrote:
I feel Peirce's originality and depth-but he does not move me greatly-I
do not sympathize with his pontifical self-satisfaction. He believes that he
can, or could if you gave him time, explain the universe. He sees cosmic
principles and his reasoning in the direction of religions, etc. seems to
me to reflect what he wants to believe-in spite of his devotion to logic.
THOMAS A. GOUDGE, THE THOUGHT OF C.S. PEIRCE 325 (1950).
" Although Holmes's attendance at the Metaphysical Club was somewhat infre-
quent. Fisch, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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himself a pragmatist. Pragmatism, he would say, was "an
amusing humbug."20 Nevertheless, it is clear that these dis-
cussions had a significant effect upon his emerging theories of
law for, despite his protestations, he repeatedly used pragmatic
methods in pursuing his own legal studies. One should note,
for example, how the predictive theory of law can be seen as an
instantiation of the pragmatic maxim.2' The maxim requires
that we analyze abstract conceptions in terms of their practical
effects on observable phenomena. The predictive theory follows
the maxim by analyzing abstract legal concepts in terms of
their discernible effects on judicial outcomes. Indeed, The Com-
mon Law,22 Holmes's influential history of the common law
tradition, is consistently pragmatic in that it analyzes each
legal concept in terms of the historical conditions that shaped
it and in terms of its real world effects on the development of
legal practices.
These surface similarities between the pragmatic method
and the predictive theory of law signal a deeper resonance as
well. There are certain concepts that are fundamental to one's
understanding of the world. For example, many of us are em-
piricists but there can be many variations on what it means to
limit ourselves to experiential knowledge.' Similarly, a
community's conception of reality and truth will have a pro-
found effect on its knowledge seeking practices. These basic
concepts provide the contours of our theories and it will be my
aim in the course of this paper to show how Holmes's ideas on
these fundamental matters shaped his legal views. Since
Holmes left no rigorous or systematic account of his philosophi-
cal views, I will use Peirce's work to suggest a context for read-
ing Holmes. Thus, in the remainder of this section, I will brief-
20 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LTRTEs 139 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
21 Max Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law and Pragmatism,
39 J. PHILOSOPHY 85 (1942).
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881).
' Experience may be reduced to sense terms or propositions. It may mean the
perception of a thing or the thing as experienced through perceptions. It can be
limited to five senses or it can include emotional experience. How one chooses
among these possibilities will have a large impact on the substance of these theo-
ries.
[Vol. 63:59
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ly describe the pragmatic philosophy of Charles Peirce. In the
next section, I will talk about Holmes's jurisprudence in the
context of Peirce's pragmatism.
A. Post-Kantian Phenomenalism and the Problem of Viewpoint
Dependency
Pragmatism is most easily understood in terms of the
Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena.2' Like
Kant, Peirce made a distinction between two entities: an object
that exists independently of human perception and the appear-
ance of an object that has meaning by virtue of representing
something besides itself. According to the pragmatic maxim,
entities of the first type (what Kant calls noumena) have no
meaning since, by definition, they are removed from human
experience. On the other hand, entities of the second type
(what Kant calls phenomena) are the building blocks of human
cognition. They are the constituents of experience and, prop-
erly understood, they convey knowledge by representing reali-
ty.
This leads to a puzzle. What do cognitions represent if
they do not represent the noumenal object? Peirce's answer to
this is that each cognition should be understood as a
representation of previous cognitions-the phenomenal mani-
festation of a table does not refer to a noumenal table but
rather to the thought of a table as it appeared in previous
cognitions. Central to this way of understanding cognition is
a type of inference that Peirce calls "abduction.' In everyday
life, we perform an abduction when we formulate an hypothe-
24 Kant believed that a distinction could be made between the appearance of a
chair, i.e., the chair as it exists in the world of sense perception, and the real
chair, Le., the chair that exists independently of human perception. The former he
called the phenomenal chair; the latter, the noumenal chair.
' I put it a bit more precisely in my earlier article on Holmes:
Thus the thought 'table" does not denote some real table but some previ-
ous thought of a table. The individual cognition relates to a subsequent
cognition by interpreting it. The thought 'table" does not simply bring to
mind the previous cognition but describes that cognition as a cognition of
a table.
Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition:
The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 553-54
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
26 For an extended discussion of abduction, see id. at 554-55.
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sis that will explain and unify experience. 7 For example, the
hypothesis "there is a stone" might explain and unify certain
initially random bits of visual and tactile data." Thus, for
Peirce, cognition does not give us direct knowledge of an exter-
nal world. Instead, it gives us a basis for hypothesizing reality
by reaching a correct understanding of the representational
relationships that individual cognitions bear to one another.29
As a result, the test of truth becomes a matter of internal logic
and coherence rather than a matter of correspondence to a
preexisting noumenal world.
It follows from Peirce's phenomenalism that viewpoint and
perspective are important concepts for understanding the
world. Investigation of the phenomenal world is vastly simpli-
fied by the adoption of two hypotheses. One is that there are
physical objects that persist in time and space. The second is
that these objects are experienced by others as well as our-
selves."0 These two hypotheses are supported by the fact that,
when we compare our experience with others, the differences
in what we see can often be explained by suppositions about
differing viewpoints and perceptual abilities. The blind man
does not see the elephant nor does a sighted person in another
room. But, while perceptions vary, we cannot help but note
that there are relatively regular relationships between a
persons viewpoint and the content of his or her cognition. We
observe, for example, that physical objects have different ap-
pearances when we view them under differing conditions and
Such hypotheses are in the form of general rules that assign representation-
al significance to present cognition and thereby form the basis for predicting the
nature of future cognition.
28 Thus, Kant's distinction between the appearance of the object and the
noumenal object gives way to a more pragmatic distinction between the appear-
ance of the object in cognition and the hypothesized object whose existence would
account for various aspects of cognition.
29 Thus, even though the series of cognitions purport to tell a story about a
larger world outside of consciousness, this appearance is fundamentally incoherent.
Under the pragmatic maxim, there is no mind-independent reality about which the
story has been told.
"0 There is the old story of the six blind men and the elephant. Each of the
men touches the elephant, but since they are all in different places, each feels
something different. One way to reconcile the differing experiences that resulted
from feeling the elephant is to suppose that there is "something out there" that
has a number of parts and to reconstruct the whole by using the various observa-
tions and what is known about the locations from which they are made.
[Vol. 63: 59
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from different viewpoints. And we also note that cognition is
shaped at all times not just by our physical circumstances but
also by our individual wants, needs and attitudes. If we are
looking for a lost pen, we see the desk drawer differently than
if we were looking for a lost notebook. If we are cold, a fire in
the fireplace will exert a particularly welcoming glow. If we
think that a house is haunted, we will see and hear more un-
explained phenomena than if we stalwartly refuse to believe in
ghosts. Thus, what we experience is at least partly determined
by who we are, what is familiar, and the nature of our expecta-
tions about future experience. This gives rise to an important
distinction between the appearance of the object in an individ-
ual stream of consciousness and the abstract notion of a public
object that is consistent with all its reported phenomenal man-
ifestations.3
The distinction between public objects and private experi-
ences poses an important question: What is real-the public
object or the private experience? In ordinary discourse, we use
the term "real" primarily to refer to public objects. If, for exam-
ple, I see an elephant that no one else seems to notice, I might
believe that the elephant is a figment of my imagination and
therefore not real. Generally, we speak of what is real in terms
of what is public and verifiable. This means that "the public"
or "the community" plays an important role in the acquisition
of knowledge.
B. The Ethics of Belief
In the last section, we saw that pragmatism rejects the
concept of a noumenal reality and requires us to view reality
as a matter of construction: a thing is real when we hypothe-
size its existence in order to make sense of the intersubjective
aspects of the phenomenal world. 2 This identification of reali-
31 Note that this distinction between private experience and public objects is
not the same as the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. The
Kantian noumenon is not a hypothesized or constructed reality. Rather, it is a
thing that is real in the sense that it is what it is independently of human expe-
rience.
"I stated it more precisely in my earlier article:
Reality is found in the fact that the opinions of individuals tend to con-
verge over the long run into agreements about particular theories. Thus,
1997]
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ty with public objects rather than noumenal objects gives the
pragmatist a distinctive theory of knowledge. For the nonprag-
matist, the theory of knowledge is epistemological in the sense
that it must provide a justification for the claim that certain
beliefs are true of the world. For the pragmatist, the theory of
knowledge addresses a different problem. The problem is not to
provide justification for individual beliefs; rather the problem
is to find a good reason for preferring one set of knowledge
acquisition habits to another.33 Thus, the pragmatist must
justify a set of practices rather than a set of beliefs and, for
this reason, the theory of knowledge becomes a special case of
ethics-it aims at giving a normative justification for particu-
lar types of thinking activity.
Peirce addresses this normative question directly in an
essay called The Fixation of Belief.' Every human being, he
argues, seeks to find beliefs that are stable, that will not dis-
solve into doubts each time we confront a new experience. He
considers four distinct strategies for accomplishing this
goal-the method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a
priori method, and the method of science. With tenacity, one
achieves stable belief by stubbornly refusing to change one's
mind. This technique yields stability but only at a cost-a
gradual withdrawal from human society and particularly from
those whose beliefs are at variance with one's own. The second
method, authority, is much like tenacity but it operates at a
wider level and depends upon the power of society to enforce
its terms. Authority maintains stable belief by using force to
suppress doubts. The third method, a priorism, also suppresses
doubt but does so by means of ungrounded abstractions rather
than force. Finally, there is the method of science which, for
Peirce, is the most desirable alternative. Science is a method
for examining and decoding the world. It begins with tentative
beliefs in certain hypotheses and a strong commitment to con-
tinuously reexamining them in the light of future experience.
the external world is real if and only if, over some indefinitely long peri-
od, we will continue to hypothesize it as a unifying explanation for cogni-
tion.
Wells Hantzis, supra note 25, at 556 (footnote omitted).
' As later pragmatists would describe it, the pragmatist believes in the prima-
cy of technique-"knowing how"-over the substantive result--knowing that."
3 5 PIRCE, supra note 17, at 5.358-5.387.
[Vol. 63:59
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Instead of silencing doubts, science utilizes them as an incen-
tive for investigation and for the development of beliefs that
are increasingly more stable. Relative to the scientific method,
truth must be understood as the final opinion of a community
of inquirers, obtained after practicing the scientific method for
an indefinite period of time.'
The concept of a scientific community is a complex notion.
Community belief is not a simple matter of taking votes to
determine whether particular claims are true. Rather, the
mark of truth is a certain kind of consensus. People may not
agree on everything. They may see different things; they may
entertain different accounts of what they see. Nevertheless,
what defines a scientific community is a general understanding
of what criteria should be used in determining whether things
are real or an aberration. Community membership is only
available to those who are committed to the discipline of a
scientific and collective search for truth.
It is important to note that Peirce's justification for science
does not rest upon its role in producing true belief. For Peirce,
science leads to truth only because that is how he defines
truth; truth is the final opinion of a scientific community. In-
stead, his rationale rests upon truly practical considerations.
On one level, it is strategic: the scientific method is the most
effective way to achieve stable beliefs. On a deeper level, how-
ever, the choice of a scientific method is not just a matter of
strategy. Peirce recognized that our choice of method defines
who we are in the world. At bottom, it is a choice of self-it
establishes identity and dictates the most intimate terms of
one's intellectual life. If, for example, we choose the method of
' 5 PEIRCE, supra note 17, at 5.407. This formulation does nothing to obscure
the inconsistency between "practicing the scientific method for an indefinite period
of time" and the concept of a "final" opinion. For this reason, modern pragmatists
often speak of truth in terms of its coherence with the best available theory.
Suppose that ten percent of the people in a given community see a pink
elephant while ninety percent see nothing. Under these circumstances, is the ele-
phant "real" or not? If fixing belief were a matter of majority rule, then we would
say that the elephant is an hallucination affecting a small minority of tho3e pres-
ent. But note that this approach is somewhat irrational. The reason why the prag-
matists see community belief as a test of truth is because they are operating
under the hypothesis that there are publicly observable physical objects, and that
differences in perception must be explained in terms of differences in ability or
viewpoint. Under this hypothesis, conflicts in perception are properly matters for
investigation and explanation rather than a matter of majority rule.
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tenacity or authority we end up as intellectual hermits or hos-
tages. Alternatively, if we choose the a priori method, we com-
mit ourselves to lives of abstraction and detachment. Only
with the scientific method do we seem to get a full life-a life
in which we are alive to the phenomenal world and part of a
human community that seeks truth. Peirce describes this
choice in highly romanticized terms:
The genius of a man's logical method should be loved and rever-
enced as his bride, whom he has chosen from all the world....
[S]he is the one that he has chosen.., he will work and fight for
her, and will not complain that there are blows to take... and will
strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of
whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage."
Thus, Peirce's response to the question-How do I decide what
to believe?-is a passionate argument for choosing the scientif-
ic method and an acknowledgement of the way in which such a
choice can affect every aspect of one's life.
II. HOLMES As AN EXPOSITOR OF PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE
In an earlier article, I attempted to document the similari-
ties between Peirce's pragmatism and Holmes's own philosoph-
ical outlook."5 Hence, there is little reason to cover the same
material here. Instead, I will focus directly on Holmes's juris-
prudence. How, according to Holmes, should judges decide
cases? Or, to put it in more Peircean terms, what are the eth-
ics of judicial decisionmaking? The foregoing discussion of
pragmatism will help us to answer these questions by giving
us a vocabulary and a structure: we can use the concept of
viewpoint dependency as a way of analyzing the judicial task
and the notion of community standards as a way of addressing
the questions that this raises.
A. Viewpoint Dependency
Viewpoint differences are an essential part of legal contro-
versy. Typically, both parties believe that they are right. Nor
can either of their beliefs be easily condemned as unreasonable
5 PEIRCE, supra note 17, at 5.387.
3' See Wells Hantzis, supra note 25.
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from their particular viewpoint. This creates a dispute that
cannot be adjudicated without doing violence to one perspec-
tive or the other.39 Since pragmatism insists that the true
outcome is found by accepting and reconciling all points of
view, a pragmatic judge cannot simply decide by endorsing the
"objectivity" of one particular perspective. Resolving the contro-
versy requires more. It requires an understanding of how indi-
vidual viewpoints may be incorporated into community stan-
dards and, ultimately, how these community standards govern
the process of judicial decisionmaking.
It is apparent that Holmes, despite his reputation for
speedy decisionmaking, did not decide cases simply by impos-
ing his own particular viewpoint upon the controversy. Indeed,
Holmes seems generally mindful of the limitations of his own
perspective:
When I say that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help
believing it. I am stating an experience as to which there is no
choice. But as there are many things that I cannot help doing that
the universe can, I do not venture to assume that my inabilities in
the way of thought are inabilities of the universe. I therefore define
the truth as the system of my limitations, and leave absolute truth
for those who are better equipped,
It is also the case that Holmes recognized the viewpoint
dependency of normative judgments. It was Holmes, after all,
who argued that law came from the concrete realm of human
experience rather than the abstract realm of logical truth.41
And just as Holmes rejected the absolutism of formal logic so
also did he reject the abstract claims of natural law theorists
who believed that law was grounded upon certain universal
moral truths: "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to
me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has
been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as
something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." 2
For an extended discussion of what it means to do violence to a world view,
see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword- Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983).
4' OLIVER WENDELL HOLEES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
303, 304-05 (1920).
41 In Holmes's review of Langdell's Treatise on Contracts, he wrote. 'The life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience." Oliver Wendell Holmes, 14
Ai. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).
42 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMiES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310,
1997]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
To the contrary, for Holmes law is a creature of the com-
munity-a contingent set of values that arose from common
practice that maintained a claim to legitimacy only so long as
they had a good effect on human affairs.
B. Community Standards and the Resolution of Viewpoint
Dependent Disputes
In an earlier paper, I argued that Holmes's predictive
theory of law could be understood in terms of the scientific
method.43 Under this interpretation, legal doctrine is under-
stood as a theory that explains and unifies patterns of legal
decisionmaking and, at the same time, provides a basis for
predicting future outcomes. This is what Holmes means when
he writes: "Tilt seems to me well to remember that men begin
with no theory at all, and with no such generalization as con-
tract. They begin with particular cases, and even when they
have generalized they are often a long way from the final gen-
eralizations of a later time."" Note how this description of
law has all the elements of pragmatic science-the gathering of
data, the generalization into certain explanatory rules, the
continuous testing of hypotheses and the progressive nature of
truth.
For Holmes, the science of law occupies the familiar
ground of legal analysis-our knowledge of precedent, our
general understanding about wise policy, and our rough sense
of community values lead us to formulate a theory about how
judges decide certain kinds of cases, and ultimately to test this
theory against the ongoing practice of legal decisionmaking.
There is, however, a certain difficulty in connection with this
view of law as science. While the notion of legal science seems
to work well as a description of legal practice, it seems to work
less well as a theory of judicial decisionmaking. Judges do not
decide cases by predicting their own decisions. To the contrary,
judges make decisions. For this reason-and for several oth-
312 (1920).
" Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of
Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 329, 355 (1994).
4" OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECT-
ED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 218 (1920).
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ers4 -- it is important to make a distinction between the pre-
dictive science of law and the decisionmaking practices that
are used to determine legal outcomes. To engage in the prac-
tice of legal decisionmaking, judges must exercise a particular-
ly personal form of judgment-they must decide each case for
themselves in an intuitive "all things considered" kind of
way." But "deciding for themselves" does not mean that they
are free from constraint. While the judgment is personal, it
must be made within the intellectual and practical context that
constructs the community's sense of justice.
In Holmes's discussions of judicial decisionmaking, we see
the community context functioning in many different ways.
The first and most obvious is through the common law. Holmes
does not think of the common law as a simple set of rules that
determine legal outcomes. Rather, for Holmes, the common law
is a more loosely defined conceptual scheme that provides both
a language for describing legal controversies and a rough or-
dering of social values that serves as a matrix for the
decisionmaking process.4 ' Thus, while it is true that judges
must decide each case in accordance with their own particular
viewpoint, it is also true that the judge's particular viewpoint
is itself constructed from the concepts of the common law and
heavily influenced by the judge's own immersion in legal cul-
ture.48
For a discussion of these, see Wells, supra note 43.
For a detailed discussion of this kind of decisionmaking, see Catharine
Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Correctiue Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
'" This is the clear import of statements like:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned.
OLVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMON LAW 1 (1881).
"It is important to note that legal expectations are also shaped by the non-
legal beliefs of the culture. Suppose, for example, that the religious beliefs of the
community center around an omnipresent and omnipotent god who speaks directly
to humans through natural activity. This would suggest that the "common law" of
the community would have numerous ways of marginalizing human agency and
emphasizing what we would call the "random elements" in accidental occurrences.
Since most of the judges in the community are raised in this culture, they would
not think of themselves as utilizing any particular bias in adjudicating tort cases,
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Within the common law framework, judges incorporate
community standards in a variety of ways. Sometimes a judge
need not formulate a standard for herself. Instead, she may try
to find an external standard by determining what group or
agency within the community may legitimately speak for the
community as a whole. In cases where there are no external
standards, the court often makes a direct appeal to community
sentiment. Many legal "rules" are thinly disguised appeals to
community norms of social behavior. For example, negligence
is defined as the absence of that degree of care that would be
used by the reasonably prudent person; self-defense is limited
to those cases where the defendant had reasonable apprehen-
sion of harm; and the meaning of a contract is determined with
reference to the way a reasonable person would have under-
stood the overt words and actions of the parties. Judges often
send the normative question in these cases to the jury as a
representative of the community but sometimes they decide
the case themselves on the basis of their own understanding of
community standards. Holmes sums up the process of judicial
decisionmaking this way:
In some cases, [the basis for decision] ... is an act of the legislature;
in others it is ... the custom or course of dealing of those classes
most interested; and in others where there is no statute, no clear
ground of policy, no practice of a specially interested class, it is the
practice of the average member of the community,-what a prudent
man would do under the circumstances,--and the judge accepts the
juryman as representing the prudent man. But still the function of
the juryman is only to inform the conscience of the court by suggest-
ing a standard .... ."
Thus, although Holmes's jurisprudence must be distinguished
from the legal science of predicting judicial outcomes, it is
nevertheless similar to science in that it focuses on community
but nevertheless tort decisionmaking would reflect such a bias. In such a commu-
nity, the decisions of a judge who decides for himself in an "all things considered"
kind of way will be highly predictable. One could predict them in one of two
ways-either by knowing (as an outsider) that there is this "act of god" bias in
the judge's conceptual scheme, or by knowing (as an internal participant in the
legal system) how the problem appears to the judge-i.e., how the common law
constructs the issue in the case.
" Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 658
(1873).
[Vol. 63:59
THE LEGAL THEORIES OF HOLMES
standards-the judge resolves viewpoint dependent disputes by
replacing individual standards with those that have the wider
endorsement of the community.
III. POsTMODERNISM-OLD-FAsHIONED AND NEW FANGLED
It is hardly a new thought that classical pragmatism has
much in common with its modem day counterpart. Contempo-
rary pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam
readily acknowledge the influence of earlier pragmatists such
as Peirce, James and Dewey. And since modem pragmatism
has important links to the various strands of postmodern
thought, it should not surprise us that there is a strong
postmodern flavor both in Peirce's pragmatism and in Holmes's
jurisprudence. Indeed, there is much about the pragmatism of
Holmes's time that anticipates what we have come to call
postmodernism. As a way of demonstrating this, I will compare
contemporary postmodernism with what I call-somewhat
oxymoronically--classical or old-fashioned postmodernism."
The comparison will center upon three claims that are funda-
mental to the postmodern position. These claims are: 1) that
reality is socially constructed; 2) that power affects the way in
which we understand reality; and 3) that legalistic notions of
equality must give way to a true respect for human differences.
A. The Social Construction of Reality
To many, the postmodern claim that reality is socially con-
structed seems counterintuitive and paradoxical at best." But
to the pragmatist it is a natural consequence of the pragmatic
maxim. As we saw above, the maxim requires that we reject
the idea that there is anything that can be known apart from
It is difficult to name the precursor of a contemporary theory that calls
itself postmodern. Strictly speaking, the "postmoderns" are really
"antimoderns"-that is, they oppose the conceptual scheme that lies at the heart of
modernism. This suggests that the proper alternative to the oxymoronic "old-fash-
ioned postmodernism" would be "pre-postmodem anti-modernism."
" For example, a common sense realist insists upon the common sense idea
that there are real things in an external world that are objects of direct percep-
tion. Social construction would also pose a difficult issue for several forms of em-
piricism including, for example, logical positivism or Lockean empiricism.
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its practical effects on human experience, as well as the idea of
a noumenal reality existing independently of human percep-
tion. As we saw above, the pragmatist thinks of real objects as
hypotheses that are "made up" to explain why there are such
regular relationships between our own cognition and that of
other people. Thus, the notion of reality does not describe a
nonhuman, nonexperiential realm but rather a hypothetical
realm that helps us to differentiate between perceptions that
are private and those that are publicly shared.
Given this view of reality, there is nothing particularly
puzzling about the claim that reality is socially constructed. In-
deed, a shared notion of reality is often a matter for explicit
negotiation. For example, I see an elephant and you see no
trace of it. We must decide whether the elephant is real. We do
this by engaging in a certain kind of discussion. We might say
to each other: "I see an elephant. You don't. Am I hallucinat-
ing? Are you blind? What do other people see? How sure are
you that there is no elephant there? Have you looked? Is there
anything which might impair your vision? How persistent and
firm is my vision? Has there been anything lately in my expe-
rience that might lead me to hallucinate?" The resolution of
these questions eventually results in a mutually satisfactory
notion of reality that does not represent an external world but
rather a mutual world that is defined by a negotiated settle-
ment of perceptual differences.
B. The Power of Power
The more we understand the process by which the public
conception of reality is formulated, the more we understand
that the process is easily tainted by the private interests of
those who are capable of dominating the discussion. Imagine,
for example, that I see an elephant and the Empress of the
World does not. I say, "I see an elephant." She says, "There is
no elephant." In a hopeful voice, I ask, "Doesn't anyone else see
it?" The crowd is silent. Why is the crowd so silent? It could be
because no one else sees the elephant. But it could also be that
those who do are afraid to speak. Or suppose there is one
brave soul who is willing to come forward: "Wait a minute," he
says, "I also see the elephant. The Empress is blind. She is
abusing her power." The crowd laughs somewhat uncomfort-
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ably. The Empress then stands to her full height and says:
"Guards! This man is hallucinating. He is dangerous. Take him
to the dungeon." The guards remove the speaker. "Now," she
says, "Does anyone else see the elephant?" Silence reigns.
These stories may seem silly and obvious but the point is real
enough: power affects discourse and therefore affects the out-
come of discussions about reality.
The process of settling group opinion is always vulnerable
to corruption and that is why the ideal of scientific inquiry
starts with two requirements: 1) that each observer have an
equal say and 2) that there be no impediments to a candid
exchange of views.52 Whether this ideal can be achieved is
itself a matter of controversy. Some argue that this ideal is
real; that it in fact regulates certain scientific and academic
communities. Others are more skeptical; they believe that the
acquisition of knowledge is strongly affected by the realities of
professional power.' Some of these skeptics note, for exam-
ple, that there are circles of discourse where a small number of
people cite to one another in order to demonstrate the truth of
their beliefs.' In any case-whatever one thinks of the quali-
ty of professional discourse-there are many who think that
there are some special cognitive problems attached to law.
They argue that law is a normative discourse and that legal
questions therefore fall on the value side of the facttvalue dis-
tinction. This means that legal questions, as opposed to scien-
tific questions, are inherently subjective and unable to be ana-
lyzed in an objective fashion.' For them, there is simply no
"2 This would be what Habermas calls "an ideal speech" situation. See, eg.,
Lawrence Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Thory of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 96-99 (1988).
' This is, for example, part of the thesis of Thomas Kuhn's book, The Struc.
ture of Scientific Revolutions. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTMIIC
REVOLUTIONS 163-67 (1962). In an academic setting, there are many dichotomies
that are created by power. Race and gender are often noted, but there are many
others: student/teacher, untenured/tenured, belonging to prestigious institu-
tion/belonging to a lesser known or less well thought of institution, etc.
' See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar. Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 562-64 (1984). It is also the case
that double standards abound. For example, appealing to common sense and per-
sonal experience in an argument about law and economics is normally considered
useful, whereas similar appeals in a race critical context are often dismissed as
being merely anecdotal.
"For a brief explanation of the factlvalue distinction and the role its rejection
19971
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
sense to the idea that discussions about ethics, law, and poli-
tics could be made free from the distortions of power.
So far, we have seen that the social construction of reality
contains the potential for abuse. The question then is, given
our largely democratic, non-empress ridden society, who has
the power of corruption, and do they exercise it in a regular
manner? Of course, we are all familiar with arguments about
ideology, false consciousness, and cultural control. One exam-
ple of this kind of argument is Marx's assertion that the ruling
class manipulates the prevailing culture in order to support its
own interests.56 Another example is Catharine MacKinnon's
analysis of sexuality-men desire to dominate women and
therefore create a culture in which female submission seems
sexy even to women themselves.57 It seems unlikely that ei-
ther of these theories describe conscious strategies-the exer-
tion of power need not be conscious in order to have its effect
on public discourse. On an unconscious level, however, if the
pragmatist is right that our perceptions are altered by our
interests, character and prior experience, then it is not hard to
see that a socially constructed reality will systematically favor
those who have the power to dominate public discussion.
C. Pragmatic Pluralism and Respect for Human Differences
While power plays an important role in the social con-
struction of reality, it does not operate in a vacuum. What
distinguishes the pragmatist from the more extreme
postmodern theorists58 is the belief that there are means by
which the influence of power can be countered and minimized.
The pragmatist chooses a scientific method rather than an
authoritarian one and this results in a further commitment to
act in ways that open up the process of inquiry. Power is per-
plays in postmodern theory, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Pragmatism, Feminism,
and the Problem of Bad Coherence, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1645, 1652-55 (1995).
56 See KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 15-16 (Pluto Press 1996)
(1888).
57 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAw 6-7 (1987).
" Foucault, for example, believes that all of our experience is so permeated by
power that it is impossible to get a foothold from which to try to ameliorate the
situation. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 93-96 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1978).
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vasive; it affects our perceptions in barely visible ways. Never-
theless, pragmatism suggests the possibility that we can adopt
strategies that lessen the effects of power. One obvious exam-
ple is freedom of speech. While speech rights do not, by them-
selves, guarantee a process that is not distorted by power, it
can, in combination with other circumstances, tend to promote
more open discussion.59 And, of course, free speech is not the
only strategy. There are others as well: increased or compensa-
tory access to the means of communication, the avoidance of
needlessly technical vocabularies, communication techniques
that undercut particular forms of coercion, the adoption of
community norms that foster inclusiveness, etc. Furthermore,
since power inevitably finds a way to circumvent its restric-
tions and to utilize unforeseen loopholes, these strategies for
increased and more equal access must be progressive-they
must adapt to changing conditions within the scientific or legal
community.
The motivating spirit of these attempts to open discussion
is pragmatic pluralism. One consequence of pragmatic plural-
ism is that individual people must be understood as different
from one another. They are not just at different stages on a
unitary path to truth; they are irreducibly and significantly
different. It can be extremely hard to keep this in mind. Wil-
11am James, in an essay called On a Certain Blindness in Hu-
man Beings' describes the problem this way:
We are practical beings, each of us with limited functions and duties
to perform. Each is bound to feel intensely the importance of his
own duties and the significance of situations that call these forth.
But this feeling is in each of us a vital secret, for sympathy with
which we vainly look to others. The others are too much absorbed in
their own vital secrets to take an interest in ours. Hence the stupidi-
ty and injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the signifi-
cance of alien lives. Hence the falsity of our judgments so far as they
presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons'
conditions or ideals."'
" For Holmes's defense of free speech as a promoter of truth, see Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
' William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, reprinted in WIL-
LIAM JAMES, TALK TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY: AND TO STUDEMs ON SOME OF
LIWS'S IDEALS (Norton & Co. 1958) (1907).
61 Id. at 149.
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Similarly, in weighing evidence, it is easy for us to assume
that the reason why our own observations are different from
those of other people is that our own are better or more accu-
rate. We convince ourselves, for example, that a person who is
blind knows less about elephants than we do-we completely
overlook the possibility that blindness may yield insights that
are unavailable to those who are sighted. Pragmatic pluralism
requires that we remember this and that we honor all forms of
difference in our attempts to order human affairs.
It follows that a pragmatist will find formal notions of
equality somewhat unhelpful. Since two things are never ex-
actly similar, the description "equal to. .. " can never stand
alone. Thus, equality is generally understood to be a relative
term-every attribution of equality explicitly or implicitly com-
pares two objects with respect to a particular characteristic. "
For example: A is equal to B in height; B is equal to C in edu-
cational qualifications; or C is equal to D with respect to the
number of years on the job. Thus the ability to enforce a claim
of equality is dependent upon an ability to say in what way
two persons are-or ought to be-equal. This cannot be done in
the absence of an agreement as to what should count in mak-
ing the relevant comparisons. But such comparisons are not
made in a neutral environment. Understandings about what
counts and what does not, about what is worth more and what
is worth less, are deeply embedded in the practices of the pre-
vailing culture; these practices, in turn, reflect the interests
and attitudes of the dominant class. For example, suppose that
a sighted person and an unsighted person apply for the job of
evicting elephants from the palace grounds. Suppose also that
the unsighted person could do a better job-perhaps she has a
strong sense of smell or particularly acute hearing. Neverthe-
less, in weighing qualifications, it is very likely that these
special qualifications will be overlooked. This is because there
is a "natural" assumption among sighted members of the com-
62 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 577-
80 (1982) (the principle of equality is empty of content, and in order to have
meaning must incorporate external values that determine which persons and treat-
ments are alike); see also Steven J. Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas":" Logical
Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136, 1148-50 (1982) (in-
corporating the logical positivist method of analysis renders both equality and
rules empty of meaning).
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munity that eyesight is required for this particular job.s
Thus, the unsighted person's powers of sense and smell are
marginalized within the prevailing culture and cannot be prop-
erly counted and compared." The problem, then, is that legal-
istic forms of equality are not simply comparisons; they are
comparisons within a context and, since such comparisons
inevitably favor those who create the context, they are not
likely instruments of reform.
A commitment to respecting difference is an essential
element of a pragmatic--or old-fashioned-postmodernism. Too
often contemporary postmodernists argue that such commit-
ments are simply too unrealistic to keep. Power is so distort-
ing, they say, that we are intellectually unable to free our-
selves from our own epistemological privileges. And, even if we
could, contemporary postmodernism gives us little reason to
renounce them. If nothing is ultimately meaningful, then what
can be the point of respecting difference? If every point of view
is equally salient, then isn't every point of view equally dispos-
able?
This dilemma stands at the center of contemporary
postmodernism. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards
nihilism.? On the other, there are those who argue that re-
spect for difference is a strong reason for reform." The prob-
lem with the former is that few of us have the temperament
for nihilism. The problem with the latter is that there is noth-
ing in postmodern theory that motivates reform.
And indeed, even when the truth of this assumption is questioned, it may
still seem that making this assumption is the most efficient way to proceed. There
are many situations where engaging in overt forms of discrimination seems to be
efficient. For example, there is the much discussed problem of the jeweler who
refuses to admit black teenagers into his store. See David Lt. Kennedy, Gunnar
Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of an American Dilemma,
259 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 86 (1987).
' Such miscountings are particularly common in discussions of racial differenc-
es. The worst forms of racial discrimination are often accompanied by a denial
that such discrimination exists. Thus the ability to function in the face of such
discrimination will not be properly nameable or measurable within the dominant
culture.
See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 49-52 (1984).
66MALRIrIN MnNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
ASRICAN LAw 50 (1990).
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Unlike contemporary postmodernism, old-fashioned
postmodernism faces this dilemma straight on by focusing its
theory of knowledge on the ethics of inquiry. There is one thing
that each person must decide for him or herself. This is the
fundamental question of who we are. Postmodernism can mean
nihilism-after all, postmoderns believe that there is no logical
reason that prohibits such a choice. Or postmodernism can
mean that we become engaged members of a human communi-
ty. This membership will not solve substantive problems once
and for all, but it can give us a manner of proceeding. If we
picture ourselves as seekers of truth and as conscientious ac-
tors on the human stage, then we must commit ourselves to all
the requirements of scientific method including empiricism,
rigor, inclusiveness, and respect for other observers. Thus, it
comes back to an almost Emersonian insistence that each
individual must harken to his own inner voice of conscience.
Morality is not the stuff of philosophical arguments; it is not a
unitary system of principles that prescribe a set of all purpose,
one size fits all rules for conduct. Each person must discov-
er-and respond to-the ideals that truly animate his or her
individual existence.
CONCLUSION: HOLMES AS A SALUTARY SYMBOL FOR AMERICAN
LAW
I have tried to lay out in a simple way the general outline
of a pragmatic/postmodern framework. The point of doing this
is not so much to convince the reader that this is the best way
to read Holmes-those arguments were made in an earlier
article6'7 -but to show that a pragmatic context makes a dif-
ference in how we interpret Holmes's legacy. What does it
mean to understand Holmes this way? What difference does it
make in how we understand his work and its effect on Ameri-
can law? My hope is that this understanding will dispel some
of the ambivalence about his contribution to our legal heritage.
The question about Holmes is not so much whether he was the
"bad man" of American law but whether his vision represents
an acceptable view about the nature of law and its function in
a just society. In this connection, I think his vision has been
' See Wells Hantzis, supra note 25.
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underestimated in two ways. First, Holmes's distrust of inflat-
ed generalizations and overblown abstractions has been mis-
takenly understood as a lack of commitment to American ideal-
ism and, second, the modesty of his world view has been
wrongly understood as cynicism.
The pragmatic insistence on the primacy of individual
perception, the relevance of viewpoint, and the good faith prac-
tice of listening as a precondition for knowledge are powerful
incentives for respecting-perhaps loving-one's neighbors. For
this reason, Holmes's framework is one that may promote a
wholesome and moral life. Why, then, is Holmes so often re-
garded as less than moral man? Why is he the subject of so
much ambivalence? One reason may be that pragmatism is a
philosophy that-in the absence of humility and genuine re-
spect for others-has some potential for abuse. But, even in
the absence of these factors, a second reason seems equally
important: Holmes's vision is at odds with a particularly Amer-
ican way of understanding the relationship between morality
and law.
The notion that Holmes is a positivist and that he denies a
connection between law and morality is only true relative to a
particular form of naturalism: the belief that American law is
based upon a genuine moral theory of natural rights and re-
sponsibilities. This form of naturalism entails the idea that
judges should view themselves as steadfast guardians of cer-
tain values. Thus, for example, if freedom of speech is a natu-
ral right, then judges should make the broadest possible inter-
pretation of both "freedom" and "speech." But, from a pragmat-
ic standpoint, this is not good judging. A pragmatist sees the
value of open debate, but at the same time understands that
ringing declarations and broad interpretations will not neces-
sarily produce goodness in the real world. For the pragmatist,
the issue is not merely to minimize restraints on speech but
rather, as a practical matter, to foster broad participation.
Holmes's disagreement with naturalism is not so much that
morality and law must be entirely distinct as it is that we
must recognize that law is only law; it does not represent the
last word in private morality. Law is what it is and, because it
is law, we can make disobedience costly. Nevertheless, short of
punishing disobedience, there is little sense in condemning
those who are not in sympathy with the law's demands.
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Those who decry Holmes's cynicism frequently mention his
conception of a man as an insignificant grain of sand or as a
ganglion within a larger universe. They have in mind passages
such as this:
It is enough for us that the universe has produced us and has
within it, as less than it, all that we believe and love. If we think of
our existence not as that of a little god outside, but as that of a gan-
glion within, we have the infinite behind us. It gives us our only but
our adequate significance. A grain of sand has the same, but what
competent person supposes that he understands a grain of sand?'
While it is certainly possible to interpret this as cynicism, it is
also possible to understand it in a more pragmatic context. In
this passage, Holmes contrasts the modest nature of the "gan-
glion within" to the pomp and circumstance of the "little god
outside." The point of this contrast is to emphasize a more
realistic appraisal of human significance; in effect, Holmes is
saying that no one being-not even one's own self-is at the
center of the universe. Rather, each human being is but a tiny
piece of "the infinite" while, at the same time, being an expres-
sion of the greater whole. And from this understanding of hu-
man life flows a not very cynical sense of joy and duty:
The rule of joy and the law of duty seem to me all one. I con-
fess that altruistic and cynically selfish talk seem to me about
equally unreal. With all humility, I think 'Whatsoever thy hand
findeth to do, do it with thy might.' infinitely more important than
the vain attempt to love one's neighbor as one's self. If you want to
hit a bird on the wing, you must have all your will in a focus, you
must not be thinking about yourself, and equally, you must not be
thinking about your neighbor; you must be living in your eye on that
bird.69
While Holmes may not admire "altruistic talk," neither does he
favor cynicism. He is not urging selfishness and indolence but
rather attention to the "rule of joy and the law of duty." Nor is
he exalting a life spent in pursuit of dramatic but simplistic
ideals. He does not urge us to do good, to pursue freedom or to
68 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 42 at 310, 316.
69 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Speech, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 244, 247
(1920).
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maximize our material goods." For Holmes, virtue is found
not in heroic action but in a kind of conscientiousness, crafts-
manship, and steady attention to detail.
All of this is not to say that Holmes should be eligible for
sainthood. While he was a man who understood the simple
values of doing one's job and respecting others, he was not
always sensitive nor was he generally free of self absorption. 1
Holmes inhabited his own time and place; 2 believed in many
of its prejudices;" and was not prone to hearing the "cries of
the wounded. ' 4 Nevertheless, he did his job well. He showed
up for work, he worked hard and productively, and he made
only a few wrong decisions in a career spanning fifty years.
Whether Holmes did the best he could is not for us to judge.
What is for us to judge is whether he represents the type of
decisionmaking that we want our judges to make. Are we hap-
py with appeals to high principle or do we want a deeper in-
quiry into the social effects of contemporary practices? Is the
genius of American law its so-called natural law aspirations or
its ingenuity in responding to difficult circumstances? Since
Holmes seems to favor the ad hoc over what we like to think of
as "immutable values," we could, with a certain amount of
righteousness, condemn him for this choice. But, to the con-
trary, I believe that it is better to fully appreciate his vir-
tues-virtues of empiricism and tolerance-and their impor-
tance to the legal practice of an ongoing democratic communi-
ty.
t70 See, eg., Holne% Path, supra note 5, at 202 where Holmes writes: "And
happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, cannot be won
simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income of fifty thou-
sand dollars."
71 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 11, at 89, where he quotes William James de-
scribing Holmes as "a powerful battery formed like a planing machine to gouge a
deep self-beneficial groove through life."
72 See, e.g., Lamson v. American Axe and Tool, 177 Mass. 144 (1900), where
Holmes applies freedom of contract notions to an assumption of the risk defense
asserted by a factory owner.
" There is, for example, Holmes's somewhat unseemly interest with the po3si-
bilities of eugenics. And indeed, his interest seems to flower into enthusiasm when
he ends his opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) with the cry [tihree gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
"' The phrase is used by William James in The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life, reprinted in WILLIA JAMES, ESSAYS I PRAG0IMTLS! 83 (Alburey
Castell ed., Hafner Publishing Co. 1968).
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